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ABSTRACT
Istvan Hont’s classic work on the theoretical links between the
seventeenth-century natural jurists Hugo Grotius and Samuel
Pufendorf and the eighteenth-century Scottish political
economists remains a popular trope among intellectual and
economic historians of various stamps. Despite this, a common
criticism levelled at Hont remains his relative lack of engagement
with the relationship between religion and economics in the early
modern period. This paper challenges this aspect of Hont’s
narrative by drawing attention to an alternative, albeit
complementary, assessment of the natural jurisprudential heritage
of eighteenth-century British political economy. Speciﬁcally, the
article attempts to map on to Hont’s thesis the Christian Stoic
interpretation of Grotius and Pufendorf which has gained greater
currency in recent years. In doing so, the paper argues that
Grotius and Pufendorf’s contributions to the ‘unsocial sociability’
debate do not necessarily lead directly to the Scottish school of
political economists, as is commonly assumed. Instead, it contends
that a reconsideration of Grotius and Pufendorf as neo-Stoic
theorists, particularly via scrutiny of their respective adaptations of
the traditional Stoic theory of oikeiosis, steers us towards the heart
of the early English ‘clerical’ Enlightenment.
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1. Introduction
Intellectual histories of economic thought remain incomplete without acknowledging the
pioneering work of Istvan Hont. His famous essay ‘The Language of Sociability and Com-
merce: Samuel Pufendorf and the Theoretical Foundations of the “Four-Stages” Theory’,
ﬁrst published in 1990, remains a cornerstone of the ﬁeld of study.1 The underlying
premise of Hont’s work revolved around the intellectual tension between Hugo Grotius
(1583–1645), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94). Commer-
cial society was ‘invented’, Hont contended, when Pufendorf adjoined Hobbes’s intellec-
tual method with Grotius’s modernised form of jurisprudence, thereby arriving at an
explanatory model detailing the reasons why, and how, individuals in a state of nature
eventually opted to enter into society. In time, Hont continued, Pufendorf’s model was
to become the foundational basis for the great ‘Four-Stages Theory’ of societal
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development synonymous with eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, most
notably David Hume (1711–76) and Adam Smith (1723–90). As Hont elsewhere put it
(in collaboration with Michael Ignatieﬀ), the natural jurisprudential tradition was there-
fore the source of Smith’s central preoccupation with the issues of ‘needs’ and ‘justice’
in the seminal Wealth of Nations (1776):
Smith was simply transposing into the language of markets an ancient jurisprudential dis-
course, carried into modernity by Grotius, Pufendorf and Locke […] designed to show
how an economy of abundance could be created in which this ancient jurisprudential anti-
nomy between the needs of the poor and the rights of the rich could be transcended
altogether.2
One of Hont’s most signiﬁcant assertions regarding Pufendorf was that the jurist facili-
tated subsequent analyses of the historical emergence of commercial society purged of its
theological connotations. Just as Grotius had inaugurated an international legal order lib-
erated from confessional strife, so too, Hont argued, did Pufendorf ﬂesh out an essentially
secular, transnational commercial order, which subsequent political economists utilised in
order to counter ‘neo-Machiavellian’ reason of state in its latest mercantile guise (encap-
sulated in the phrase ‘jealousy of trade’).3 In doing so, Hont contrasted Pufendorf’s soci-
able trajectory with a distinctly theological account of the genesis of commercial sociability
which emerged in parallel in the late seventeenth-century. This was the Epicurean-Augus-
tinianism of French Jansenists such as Pierre Nicole (1625–95) and Blaise Pascal (1623–
62), who claimed that God’s redemptive plan for Fallen humanity revealed itself in the
unintended socioeconomic utility engendered by individual selﬁshness and cupidity.4 In
recent decades, it has become something of a commonplace to couple this Epicurean-
Augustinian tradition with conventional, self-interest-based accounts of the genesis of
modern economic thought.5 In large part, this is because of its perceived and actual com-
patibility with, among others, the ‘Passions and Interests’ model popularised by Albert
O. Hirschman in the 1970s and the theory of spontaneous order which now pervades
the contemporary social sciences.6 In many respects, Hont’s thesis did not deviate
much from this approach. Consigning the theological rationalisation for the emergence
of commercial sociability to the Augustinian-Epicureanism of Nicole et al., conversely,
Hont’s reading of Grotius and Pufendorf was essentially secular in tone. Yet was Hont’s
evaluation correct on this head?
This paper argues that there is strong reason to challenge this aspect of Hont’s thesis. In
the ﬁrst instance, any consideration of Grotius’s foundational inﬂuence demands acknowl-
edgement of the jurist’s well-known theoretical inconsistency, the result of which is that he
has become ‘posthumously all things to all men’.7 In turn, this variability has led to per-
sistent, conﬂicting accounts about the nature of Grotius’s legacy, invariably revolving
around whether or not he was an Epicurean or Stoic thinker, secular or Christian in his
approach, or a Scholastic-Aristotelian as opposed to a ‘modern’ natural law theorist.
This said, the foundational premise of this paper is far from novel. In unison with
many scholars, it contends that Grotius’s theological and philosophical ambiguity orig-
inates, in large part, in the discrepancy between the self-interested and sociable aspects
of his thought. Where it does diﬀer signiﬁcantly from extant analyses, however, is in its
identiﬁcation of both the initial locus and subsequent trajectory of this famous Grotian
dichotomy. Speciﬁcally, this paper contends that the ‘self-interest versus sociability’
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conundrum, which served as the blueprint for the eighteenth-century science of man,
homo economicus and homo socius, was an unintended consequence of Grotius’s utilis-
ation of Stoic oikeiosis in The Rights of War and Peace (1625). Furthermore, the article
claims that Pufendorf’s theoretical perpetuation of the oikeiosis process, via a crucial
detour through Hobbes’s state of nature, leads us to a markedly diﬀerent conclusion to
that which Hont proposed.
Why is this signiﬁcant? Oikeiosis is a traditional Stoic term signifying, at its most rudi-
mentary, the ethical disparity between one’s sense of ‘self’ and ‘other’. Additionally, oikeio-
sis shares its etymological root with the term oikonomia, which is today rendered in
English as ‘economics’. Consequently, a growing number of studies acknowledge oikeiosis
as a foundational principle in the history of Western political and economic thought. In
recent times, for example, oikeiosis has become increasingly associated with early
modern debates about cosmopolitanism, patriotism and the foundations of international
ethics and international law, particularly in an eighteenth-century British context.8 From
the perspective of this paper, however, what is most signiﬁcant is the application of oikeio-
sis to Smith’s economic thought. According to Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Smith ‘embraced
oikeiosis as an empirical fact’, yet rejected its cosmopolitan and teleological conclusions.9
Accordingly, she argues that Smith’s qualiﬁed adoption of oikeiosis is revelatory in the
context of the classic Das Adam Smith Problem: that is, the perceived disparity between
the ostensibly mechanistic and ‘self-interested’ economics of The Wealth of Nations
(1776) and the ‘sociable’ meta-ethics of The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1758).10 ‘Are
the books consistent or continuous?’, Forman-Barzilai summarises. ‘And if not, which
in Smith’s mind was prior? Was Smith primarily an ethical or an economic thinker?
Were human beings driven primarily by sympathy or self-interest, virtue or vice? Homo
socius or homo oeconomicus?’11
Though I believe the tension is putatively artiﬁcial… I revisit the problem… to challenge
economic interpretations of the Smithian self as driven primarily by egoism and utility con-
siderations, and the tendency among non-specialists and in public discourse generally to
reduce the Smithian self to ‘economic man.’ I argue that the self was complex for Smith,
and often quite conﬂicted, struggling to negotiate tensions between its selﬁsh and other-
regarding tendencies.12
To an extent, the present author agrees with Forman-Barzilai that the Stoic theory of
oikeiosis shaped, in certain of its aspects, eighteenth-century debates about the historical
advent of commercial society. Additionally, the present paper concurs with her analysis
that a neo-Stoic reading of Smith yields a plausible (though hardly unequivocal) interpret-
ation of the Scot’s political economy as a signiﬁcant manifestation of the oikeiosis prin-
ciple.13 Be that as it may, this work asserts that far more can and ought to be done to
chart—in precise terms—the emergence and propagation of Stoic oikeiosis in seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century economic discourse. This endeavour is important, because it sheds
new light on well-worn, though as yet underdeveloped, inquiries into the moral-philoso-
phical and theological foundations of eighteenth-century British political economy.
Speciﬁcally, the paper claims that a neo-Stoic, or Christian Stoic, reading of the seven-
teenth-century jurists oﬀers a theoretical counterpoise to the dominant neo-Epicurean-
Augustinianism within which much of the era’s political economy is currently
framed.14 Extrapolating one step further from these points, these pages contend that an
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examination of the Grotian-Pufendorﬁan and neo-Stoic-oikeioisis trajectory does not
necessarily lead inexorably to the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, as is
commonly supposed. Rather, they suggest that a reappraisal of these subjects steers us
towards the very heart of the early English Enlightenment, vis-a-vis the Anglican establish-
ment duo Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1751) and Dean Josiah Tucker (1713–99).
As conventional analyses have it, of which Hont’s is perhaps the most exhaustive, two
of the most important intellectual conduits for the transposition of Grotius and Pufen-
dorf’s ideas to the eighteenth-century Scottish universities and beyond were, among
others,15 Gershom Carmicheal (c. 1672–1729) and Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746);
both of whom were predecessors of Smith on the Chair of Moral Philosophy at the Uni-
versity of Glasgow. Small wonder, then, that the seventeenth-century jurists are so often
cited as the intellectual progenitors of eighteenth-century Scottish jurisprudence,
natural law and, in the second half of the century, political economy.16 There is,
however, a signiﬁcant ﬂy in the ointment regarding this analysis. As these pages will
demonstrate, Butler and Tucker’s brand of English Christian political economy owed a
substantial debt to the continental Protestant natural law tradition – a fact which extant
analyses scarcely acknowledge, let alone account for.17 The reason for this lack of attention
is hardly mystifying. It has long been established that Georgian clerics, most of whom were
educated in the ancient English universities, were by and large left unexposed to inﬂuences
from the Continental mainland. This is in stark contrast to the moderate Calvinism which
became entrenched in Scotland and isolated, provincial – that is to say, dissenting –
pockets of England. As Terence H. Irwin elaborates:
Both Scottish Presbyterians and English and Welsh Dissenters seem to have been exposed to
Continental inﬂuences that did not aﬀect English Anglican writers to the same degree. The
study of Grotius and Pufendorf was entrenched both in Glasgow and in Philip Doddridge’s
[1702–51] Dissenting academy, but English Anglican writers do not refer to them as often.18
Crucially, however, Butler was a Presbyterian by birth and, famously, a later Anglican
convert, meaning that he both conformed with, and diverged from, this conﬁguration.
This said, the ﬁnal introductory premise of this paper is that the neo-Stoic variant of
the natural law tradition became deeply embedded in the Oxford-educated Tucker’s pol-
itical economy via Butler, whom Tucker served as private chaplain from 1739 until Butler’s
death in 1752.
The links between Butler and Tucker have been noted transiently in extant histories of
economic thought.19 However, it is only recently that the full implications of their intel-
lectual and theo-philosophical partnership have begun to receive sustained treatment.20
Typically, Butler and Tucker’s contributions to eighteenth-century economic discourse
have been analysed via means of their putative ‘emergence’ from the Newtonian natural
theology tradition – a perception that is reinforced by Butler’s well-known correspondence
with the Boyle Lecturer Samuel Clarke (1675–1729), which precipitated the former’s con-
version to the Anglican ministry in the mid-1710s.21 This paper does not seek to disavow
this exposition. The Newtonian natural theology tradition was indeed pervasive among the
British intellectual classes during the eighteenth-century, especially among Georgian pre-
lates, and Butler and Tucker were no exception to this.22 At the same time, however, these
pages suggest that Butler and Tucker’s Newtonianism operated in tandem with what
Marco Barducci has recently called the
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[n]eo-Platonism, neo-Stoicism, and Erasmian humanism [which] were… some of the main
sources of Grotius’ ethics, epistemology, and theology, and [which] converged [at about the
turn of the eighteenth-century] on the backdrop of the latitudinarian movement and of ‘Eng-
land’s moderate mainstream Enlightenment’.23
This said, our task in what follows is to adumbrate at least one signiﬁcant ramiﬁcation
of this complex intermingling of narratives and traditions: namely that of the emergence of
Butler and Tucker’s socioeconomic thought.
The present author is well aware that there is a great deal of scepticism regarding the
plausibility of an association between early modern neo-Stoicism and eighteenth-century
political economy, still more that it might be applied to Butler and Tucker’s ideas to any
meaningful extent. Accordingly, this paper is intended as a response of sorts to these mis-
givings.24 To this end, the article proceeds in Section 2 with discussion of Grotius’s util-
isation of Stoic oikeiosis in its ‘personal’ and ‘social’ forms, drawing particular attention
to his distinction between animal, human and divine nature, which is an important leit-
motif of the oikeiosis process. Its main contention is that the Grotian understanding of
oikeiosis is a major signiﬁer of the jurist’s ambiguous legacy, whether among his immediate
and eighteenth-century successors or among present-day historians. Section 3 details
Hobbes and Pufendorf’s various responses to Grotius, highlighting above all the latter’s
co-option of important aspects of his two predecessors’ thought. Adapting Hont’s
thesis, the section’s central argument is that Pufendorf’s ‘pre-commercial’ language of
self-love and sociability gains far greater clarity when viewed through a neo-Stoic lens.
Section 4 changes tack by turning to Butler’s iteration of oikeiosis in an eighteenth-
century British/Anglican context. Speciﬁcally, it discusses the Butlerian reformulation of
the ‘self-love versus sociability’ motif in terms of the disparity between ‘Brute Creation’
and ‘Moral Government’. This exposition culminates in Section 5 with Tucker’s Christian
Stoic response to Bernard Mandeville’s Hobbesian and neo-Epicurean-Augustinian cri-
tique of commercial modernity, where it posits that Tucker’s economic thought is the
logical highpoint of the oikeiosis process. The paper closes in Section 6 with a brief reap-
praisal of Butler and Tucker’s signiﬁcance to the eighteenth-century ‘commercial sociabil-
ity’ debate and the Scottish Enlightenment.
2. From ‘personal’ to ‘social’ Oikeiosis: Hugo Grotius
In the famous ‘Prolegomena’ to The Rights of War and Peace (1625), Grotius sets down the
basis for his system of natural law. ‘Man is indeed an Animal’, he writes, but one of a very
high Order, and that excells all the other Species of Animals much more than they diﬀer
from one another; as the many Actions proper only to Mankind suﬃciently demonstrate:
Now amongst the Things peculiar to Man, is his Desire of Society, that is, a certain Inclination
to live with those of his own Kind, not in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Com-
munity regulated according to the best of his Understanding; which Disposition the Stoicks
termed oikeiosis. Therefore the Saying, that every Creature is led by Nature to seek its own
private Advantage, expressed thus universally, must not be granted.25
Many scholars contend that it is this passage which conﬁrms that Grotius was basically a
Stoic thinker, setting in train the great seventeenth- and eighteenth-century debate about
man’s suitability for society (appetitus societatis) and the legal and juridical parameters
around which his rights might be secured. Nevertheless, the theo-philosophical
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foundations of Grotius’s thought remain a rather large bone of contention among special-
ists. Richard Tuck, for example, remains consistently forthright in his view that the
Grotian scheme was anchored by the primacy of self-interest, since this approach was
Grotius’s only credible means of refuting the challenge of post-Renaissance scepticism,
particularly the contemporary renewal of interest in the ancient Academic Sceptic
Carneades.26 On the other hand, Tuck’s interpretation has also been criticised for
leaning too far towards scepticism or Epicureanism,27 with some scholars arguing that
the jurist’s system sanctioned human sociability above all else,28 while others still claim
that Grotius was ﬁnely poised between the two poles.29
Ironically, it is precisely Grotius’s distinction between human and animal nature in the
above-cited, alongside his utilisation of oikeiosis, which fuels much of the uncertainty as
to where he himself stood on the matter. For while oikeiosis is often considered to be an
unambiguously Stoic term, typically associated with Cicero and the third century Stoic
Hierocles, a closer reading reveals that the phrase eludes any single, precise deﬁnition.
Derived from the Greek root oikos (meaning the management of the private sphere or
household), and loosely translated as ‘approbation’ or ‘familiarisation’, at its most basic
oikeiosis connotes the conceptual space existing within all rational creatures between their
self-interest on the one side and their concern for others on the other.30 Hierocles’s
famous deﬁnition, based on an evocative theory of concentric circles, relays the image of
rings expanding outwards from the immediate proximity of the innermost self, to one’s
own family, to one’s friends and neighbours, to one’s local community, to one’s nation,
and so on, until the ﬁnal ring encompasses humanity as a whole. Based on this description,
Julia Annas claims that oikeiosis is the most radically teleological component of the Stoic
philosophy, in that it enjoins all rational beings to view the world (and indeed the universe)
not from the limited standpoint of self-centeredness, but rather from the perspective of one’s
relation to a greater whole.31 Insofar as this model has been applied to early modern political
thought, scholars have ascribed the concept with various labels such as ‘Stoic universalism’,
‘Stoic naturalism’, ‘cosmopolitan providence’, the ‘providential design model’ or ‘providen-
tial naturalism’.32 However, the key point we are attempting to get across at this stage is that,
during the early modern period, oikeiosis was generally invoked as a rhetorical adjunct for
Stoic sociability and the sympathetic, benevolent aﬀections. Furthermore, these categories
were deemed to be the preserve both of cosmic and human nature, since, according to
the ancient Stoics, they were essentially interchangeable.
In Christopher Brooke’s lucid treatment of the revival of early modern Stoicism, he
contends that Annas’s deﬁnition of oikeiosis is particularly applicable to Grotius.33 This
is because he sees a strong aﬃnity between Annas’s deployment of the term and
Cicero’s in Di ﬁnibus, which Grotius frequently appeals to in Rights of War and Peace.
Speciﬁcally, Brooke approves of Annas’s distinction between ‘personal’ oikeiosis (linked
to Cicero’s account in Di ﬁnibus III. 16–21) and ‘social’ oikeiosis (III. 62–71), which Jon
Miller elsewhere describes as two ‘aspects of one fundamental impulse’.34 And yet,
herein lies the rub. For while ‘social’ oikeiosis is evidently intended to be an outward-
facing proposition, underscoring the individual’s care and concern for the collective
common good, the opposite and opposing force within human nature is, of course, said
to be ‘personal’ oikeiosis, which maintains that individual persons seek, reﬂexively, to
place their self-preservation above all else. To a profound extent, then, this dichotomy
is the wellspring of the ambiguity regarding Grotius’s true allegiance on this head. Did
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the natural jurist position self-preservation at the forefront of his system? Or was it rather
man’s impulse for society, the appetitus societatis, which was of greater import within the
Grotian scheme?
Benjamin Straumann, who identiﬁes the origins of Grotius’s thought in the Roman law
tradition, generally agrees with Brooke that Grotius’s version of oikeiosis was essentially
Ciceronian, and therefore anti-Epicurean, in origin. Straumann proposes further,
however, that Grotius’s reformulation of the concept was distinctly anthropological in
tone: that is to say that Grotius stressed the primacy of ‘social’ over ‘personal’ oikeiosis
so as to ‘refute the Carneadean claim that all animals strive only for their own advan-
tage’.35 Put otherwise, while Grotius accepted the permanent presence of the individual’s
drive towards their own advantage (utilitatum suarum stadium), by the same token, he did
not preclude the existence of their opposing drive toward society. Explaining why the latter
instinct was far more pronounced in humans than animals was, therefore, a central
concern within the Grotian scheme:
But it must be owned that a Man grown up, being capable of acting in the same Manner with
respect to Things that are alike, has, besides an exquisite Desire of Society, for the Satisfaction
of which he alone of all Animals has received from Nature a peculiar Instrument, viz. the Use of
Speech; I say, that he has, besides that, a Faculty of knowing and acting, according to some
general Principles; so that what relates to this Faculty is not common to all Animals, but prop-
erly and peculiarly agrees to Mankind.36
For Grotius, then, following the Stoics and Aristotle, it was man’s capacity for reason and
rationality (recta ratio), and especially his use of speech (logos), which inclined him towards
society. For while animals and human infants evidently displayed an instinctive aptitude for
‘personal’ oikeiosis, it was only in the fully grown, mature adult that ‘social’ oikeiosis—
deﬁned as rationality’s telos—could be said to preside over one’s outward actions. In classical
discourse, this notion was exempliﬁed by the wise Stoic sage who had achieved true wisdom
via slow and deliberative reﬂection. Analogically, it was by these means that the individual
became increasingly cognisant of, and sympathetic to, the manifold concerns of others.
Extrapolating from this, Grotius recognised as axiomatic the bifurcated character of rational
human life. For, on the one side, he observed, individuals were clearly comprised of natural
drives and instincts (prima naturae/self-preservation); yet on the other, humans also con-
sisted of right reason and sound judgement (honestum/society). According to Grotius,
natural justice (ius naturalle) was therefore any action that did not injure another
person’s suum cuique (‘mine and thine’, or ‘may all get their due’).37 Furthermore,
whether one spoke of the natural law in terms of iura (‘perfect rights’; the minimal moral
foundation necessary for social life),38 or aptitudines (‘imperfect rights’; any level of morality
unrelated to the necessaries of life),39 Grotius asserted that justice (ius), in its three signiﬁca-
tions, was an inherent moral characteristic in all humans irrespective of creed or race:
[First] Right signiﬁes merely that which is just, and that too rather in a negative than a posi-
tive Sense. So that the Right of War is properly that which may be done without Injustice with
regard to an Enemy. Now that is unjust which is repugnant to the Nature of a Society of
reasonable Creatures… 40
[Second]… another Signiﬁcation of the Word Right diﬀerent from this, but yet arising from
it,… relates directly to the Person: In which Sense Right is a moral Quality [qualitas moralis]
annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly… 41
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There is also a third Sense of the Word Right, according to which it signiﬁes the same Thing
as Law [lex], when taken in its largest Extent, as being a Rule of Moral Actions, obliging us to
that which is good and commendable.42
As Knud Haakonssen summarises, the underlying principle of Grotius’s conception of
justice is therefore the cultivation of social relations; for without this there can be no pro-
spect of living in peaceable society, nor of interacting with one’s fellow kind. Moreover,
maintaining sociability requires that humans balance their ‘pure self-interest and social
inclinations by entering into contractual relationships’, leading, in turn, to the develop-
ment of Law (lex) in the guise of property relations, modes of living, structures of auth-
ority, the punishment of transgressions and so on.43
Much more could of course be said about these and many other aspects of Grotius’s
thought. In the context of this paper, however, the key point we are attempting to get
across is Grotius’s identiﬁcation of rights and obligations (which are essentially his con-
ception of the foundation of natural law) with anthropological human nature, associated
in turn with Stoic oikeiosis. That is to say that, while Grotius accepted the basic tenets of
Christianity, arguing that natural justice (ius naturelle) was prescribed by God, he main-
tained further that humans unaided by religion were capable of reaching some form of
consensus (concordia) regarding the contractual, and quasi-contractual, obligations
upon which social life rested. In so doing, it is often remarked that Grotius’s main ‘achieve-
ment’ was, of course, that he separated theology from natural law, thereby facilitating on
rational grounds the modern international legal order: that is, an order liberated from
moral relativism and the threat of confessional strife.44 Yet what is perhaps most intri-
guing from our present standpoint is the way in which, via the psychological mechanisms
of ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis, the hierarchy between animal, human and divine nature
eﬀectively collapses, meaning that the Grotian appetitus societatis is essentially perceived
in universalist terms. (This is not to suggest that Grotius demoted God’s status but rather
that he elevated rational human nature).45 It is in this respect that Grotius may be labelled
a neo-Stoic thinker; and, moreover, in a Lipsian vein, as Christopher A. Ford has argued
quite persuasively.46 Yet despite this, Grotius’s ambivalence is of course never far away. As
Hans. W. Blom observes, throughout his writing Grotius is consistently ‘evasive and eclec-
tic at the same time, making his arguments acceptable to diﬀerent ideological commu-
nities, precisely by avoiding taking sides’.47 It is the consequences of this aspect of
Grotius’s thought for his intellectual followers that we are addressing in these pages.
3. The language of self-love and sociability in ‘pre-commercial’ society:
Thomas Hobbes and Samuel Pufendorf
As we shall shortly see, it was left above all to Pufendorf to reﬁne Grotius’s distinction
between human and animal nature, and to better deﬁne the relationship between
natural law and divine volitional law. Before doing so, however, we must ﬁrst turn
brieﬂy to Hobbes, since it was he that Pufendorf was forced to circumvent in order to
reach his very diﬀerent, yet complementary, conclusions. While Hobbes agreed with
Grotius that humans were given the world to use, he fundamentally disagreed that socia-
bility was the overriding constituent of human nature. On the contrary, in Leviathan
(1649) Hobbes infamously declared that equality among individuals in the state of
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nature led to the condition of anarchy, which he based on ‘three principle causes of
quarrel’: ﬁrstly ‘competition’, which ‘maketh men invade for gain’; secondly ‘diﬃdence’,
which individuals oﬀered up for their minimal level of ‘safety’; and lastly ‘glory’, which
is man’s desire (more pronounced in some individuals) for ‘reputation’. ‘Hereby it is mani-
fest’, Hobbes thereby concluded, ‘that during the time men live without a common power
to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is
of every man, against every man’.48
From this fundamental premise, there followed an unavoidably pessimistic social psy-
chology accentuating humanity’s mutual untrustworthiness, and placing moral relativism
and scepticism at its very core. Notwithstanding this major propositional disparity,
Hobbes did, however, agree with Grotius that language was the bedrock of man’s rational
faculties. This propensity accounted, for example, for the development of the arts and
sciences and indeed all human civilisation. Yet by the same token, Hobbes declared that
language was simultaneously the fount of lies, deceits and falsehoods, which ambitious
men deployed in their pursuit of prestige and gain. Viewed from this perspective,
human morals, far from being a series of a priori prescriptions (whether divine or other-
wise), were, in truth, ‘self-imposed’ or ‘artiﬁcial’ constructs. Consequently, for Hobbes,
morals did not necessarily conform to human nature tout court, for they were merely
the prudential means of protecting oneself against innumerable random acts performed
by others which might interfere with, or threaten, one’s own survival.49 Accordingly,
‘Just Naturale [natural justice]’, Hobbes concluded,
is the liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of
his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing any thing, which in
his own judgement, and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.50
As is well known, Hobbes’s answer to this moral and intellectual impasse was distinctly
political. Only by relinquishing a sizeable portion of one’s individual liberty, and placing it
in the hands of the sovereign, could self-preservation among individuals be (said to be)
mutually assured. In consequence, Hobbes asserted that the notion of moral authority
was inter-subjectively the sovereign’s law, and this he labelled both the natural law and
the social contract, so ‘that men perform their covenants made’:51
The only way to erect… a common power, as may be able to defend [peoples] from the inva-
sion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another… is, to confer all their power and strength
upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of
voices, unto one will… This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a COM-
MONWEALTH, in Latin CIVITAS… the great LEVIATHAN…
And he that carrieth this person, is called SOVEREIGN, and is said to have sovereign power;
and every one besides, his SUBJECT.52
Unsurprisingly, the scandalous nature of Hobbes’s position prompted most of his con-
temporaries and successors to label him an Epicurean-materialist; a moral relativist and
sceptic far worse than any Renaissance humanist had been.53 For if, as Hobbes appeared
to be claiming, human nature was merely the sum-total of its animal passions and
instincts, and if by extension the sovereign’s law was but a mere mirror and reﬂection
of these ‘base’ principles, in what sense could a plausible distinction be made between
the state of nature and civil society? Worse still, if humans were not sociable agents à la
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Aristotle, the Stoics and Grotius, how could society’s moral and legal norms be conceived
as the product of divine and/or rational endowment?54 Were social relations even possible
within the Hobbesian scheme? Correspondingly, was the Grotian appetitus societatis little
more than a vain fancy? These were some of the pressing issues Pufendorf faced.
Traditionally, Pufendorf’s ideas have been scrutinised through his adoption of the post-
Baconian deductive sciences and Cartesian dualism, both of which facilitated the jurist’s
central distinction between the physical world (entia physica), discoverable a posteriori,
and the moral world (entia moralia), which Pufendorf believed was self-existent a
priori. In either case, Pufendorf insisted that the physical and moral worlds were
created by God. Crucially, however, it was only the latter which he equated with basic
human nature, and this meant, as Grotius had showed, that the principle of self-preser-
vation was an inherently moral faculty, contra Hobbes. Crucially, then, while Pufendorf
clearly admired the author of the Leviathan, has Haakonssen has shown, his Lutheran
pietism obliged him to reject the most incendiary aspects of the Hobbesian scheme,
most notably its radically reductionist interpretation of self-preservation and its moral
relativism.55 Additionally, although Pufendorf ultimately sided with Grotius regarding
the sociable content, though not necessarily the sociable foundation, of the natural law,
he remained dissatisﬁed with the Dutch jurist’s allegedly ‘unsystematic’ method (i.e. its
perceived aﬃnities with pre-Renaissance scholasticism), alongside Grotius’s seeming over-
reliance on mankind’s rational faculties at the expense of the higher authority of God.56
To better understand how Pufendorf reconciled the disparities between Grotius and
Hobbes, it may be beneﬁcial to turn at this stage to the neo-Stoic interpretation of the
jurist which has gained greater currency in recent years. Promulgated by the likes of
Horst Denzer, Tim Hochstrasser, Fiammetta Palladini and Kari Saastamoinen among
others, these scholars have drawn important attention to the Stoic inﬂections in Pufen-
dorf’s major works Of the Law of Nature and Nations (1672) and The Whole Duty of
Man, According to the Law of Nature (1673).57 Denzer observed, for example, that
there at least 310 references to Stoic authors in the latter treatise, which Hochstrasser
sees as clear evidence of Pufendorf’s ‘eclectic method’ in ‘combining conceptual analysis
of a modern author (Grotius), and of ancient Stoic insights, to rebut central contentions
from [Hobbes]’.58 Be that as it may, it is vitally important to note that Pufendorf’s
subversion of Hobbes’s scheme ultimately relied, paradoxically, on his adoption of
Hobbes’s sovereign, which Pufendorf ultimately conceived as God.59 Because of this,
the present author contends that the German jurist’s brand of Christian Stoicism was
arguably even more Christian in its orientation than was Grotius’s. In the remainder
of this section our task, then, is to unpack what this analysis entails in the context of
Pufendorf’s theoretical anticipation of eighteenth-century notions of commercial socia-
bility, à la Hont.
Like Grotius, Pufendorf’s Stoic aﬃnities were palpable, though necessarily far more
cautious. Confronted, unlike Grotius, with Hobbes’s potent brand of materialism and
scepticism, he was forced to concede that the wellspring of the natural law was indeed indi-
vidual self-preservation. Crucially, however, in Pufendorf’s mind, this admission did not
necessarily imply that self-love was directly oppositional to Grotius’s broadly neo-Stoic
thesis. Indeed, as he made abundantly clear in Of the Law of Nature and Nations: ‘Self-
love and Sociableness ought by no Means to be made Opposites’.60 This said, it was in
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re-examining the variances between human and animal nature that Pufendorf made his
decisive pivot back to Grotius’s foundational oikeiosis argument:
Man is an Animal extremely desirous of his own Preservation, of himself expos’d to many
Wants, unable to secure his own Safety and Maintenance, without the Assistance of his
Fellows and capable of returning the Kindness by the Furtherance of mutual Good…
Now that such a Creature [as Man] may be preserv’d and supported… it is necessary that
he be social… This then will appear a fundamental Law of Nature, Every Man ought, as
far as in him lies, to promote and preserve a peaceful Sociableness with others, agreeable to
the main End and Disposition of the human Race in general.61
The novelty of Pufendorf’s system, then, was that it achieved a shrewd synthesis of the
Grotian oikeiosis principle and Hobbes’s state of nature. Adjoining Grotius’s modernised
form of jurisprudence with Hobbes’s intellectual method, Pufendorf argued that it is pre-
cisely because individuals in a state of nature are so incredibly weak (imbecillitas), both in
the moral and physical world, that they feel compelled to seek their own safety (salvum)
within society. This recourse to mutual co-operation, by which means it is possible for
human beings to survive and prosper even though they are most capable of inﬂicting
damage upon themselves and their fellow kind,62 Pufendorf labelled socialitas (‘sociality’).
Furthermore, for Pufendorf, this was the foundational (i.e. God-willed) principle of the
natural law, which every human is obliged to cultivate and preserve in the interests of
the collective – though in the ﬁrst instance, and crucially, by preserving oneself.63 As Saas-
tamoinen has thus put it:
In Pufendorf’s theory, the ultimate epistemological foundation of natural law, the one that
gives us its end, is not human nature, but the idea that God wants the human species to
survive… That God wants the safety of the whole human species… is the normative prin-
ciple which Hobbes’ [and indeed Grotius’s] theory lacked, and which explains why we
have an obligation to act peacefully even towards those who are able to hurt us.64
As noted at the outset of this essay, according to Hont, Pufendorf’s intellectual oscil-
lation between Grotius and Hobbes constituted a watershed moment in the developmental
history of the modern state. This is because, in Hont’s view, Pufendorf’s ‘Grotian’ ‘amend-
ment’ to Hobbes’s state of nature resulted in the ‘invention’ of society in its recognisably
‘modern’ guise: namely ‘commercial society’.65 Whereas Hobbes’s doctrine was unam-
biguously political in character, and it therefore had little to say about trade and com-
merce,66 Hont contended that Pufendorf’s ‘partial reversal’67 of his predecessor’s
conclusions facilitated the great eighteenth-century debate about the historical rise and
progress of civil society and the economic dimensions increasingly associated with it.
Although Pufendorf was unable to conceptualise what this scheme entailed in precise
terms, for Hont, it was above all the jurist’s ‘reinstatement of utility as a force for social
integration’—namely, Pufendorf’s theory about human weakness (imbecillitas) and needi-
ness (indigentia) precipitating human industry (cultura)—which led humans away from
the state of nature towards peaceful forms of social consensus and commerce.68
Yet, given all that we have discussed in the intervening pages, is it possible or indeed
desirable to map the neo-Stoic characterisation of Grotius and Pufendorf onto Hont’s
thesis?69 After all, one fundamental aspect of Hont’s narrative which is directly pertinent
to the present discussion is his exposition of the jurists’ assessment of the disparity
between human and animal nature (which we have endeavoured to elucidate in terms
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of Stoic oikeiosis, whereas evidently Hont does not). Speciﬁcally, Hont draws attention to
Pufendorf’s central contention that the relationship between humans and animals is one
of paradoxical inferiority and superiority.70 Whereas animals are superiorly equipped,
argues Pufendorf, via their carnal appetites and instincts, to ensure their own survival,
conversely man’s ‘exceeding Weakness’ precipitates his desire to move beyond the
immediate vicinity of his own self-preservation, in an ‘insatiable Desire and Thirst for
those Things which are altogether superﬂuous and unnecessary’.71 According to Pufen-
dorf (contra Grotius), then, this predilection accounted for man’s natural sociability in a
secondary rather than a primary sense, in that it ensured the preservation of human
society and the species at large in processes of time (custodia societatis humanae).
Even more signiﬁcantly, Pufendorf’s historicist claim that humanity’s increasing needs
and wants precipitated material inequality in the ‘Natural State’ also served to confute
Hobbes’s opposing contention that a state of equality (or natural liberty) existed
among the earliest roaming families. For one thing, Pufendorf’s notion of ‘Paternal Auth-
ority’ or ‘Paternal Power’ over one’s own oﬀspring immediately disavowed Hobbes’s
claim.72 This observation is highly signiﬁcant since, as Straumann points out, parental
authority—i.e. the notion that some form of natural hierarchy existed prior to the for-
mation of civil society—was second only to self-preservation in the oikeiosis process.73
Accordingly, for Pufendorf, it was wrong to assert that natural liberty among humans
was antecedent to the developmental processes of history, civilisation, culture or com-
merce; rather natural liberty was a by-product of the aforementioned. Consequently,
unlike Hobbes’s state of nature (and soon to be Locke’s), the Pufendorﬁan analogue
was purely ﬁctitious. This is a critically important point which we shall be obliged to
return to in the context of Tucker below.74
So far, these pages have claimed that signiﬁcant aspects of Hont’s thesis are com-
patible with a neo-Stoic reading of Grotius and Pufendorf. Speciﬁcally, Pufendorf’s
imbecillitas—indigentia—cultura scheme mirrors very closely Grotius’s implemen-
tation of the mechanical processes leading from ‘personal’ to ‘social’ oikeiosis, which
subsequent theorists and present-day specialists alike appear largely to have missed.
It is possible, for example, that Hutcheson overlooked this fundamentally important
aspect of Pufendorf’s thought when he described the German’s scheme as an ‘“Epicur-
ean” conjecture’.75 The same might also be said, more recently, of Ian Hunter’s charac-
terisation of Pufendorf’s model as an ‘Epicurean anthropology’ premised on the
‘radical separation of moral theology from politics and law’.76 In sharp contrast,
however, this essay asserts that there is ample evidence to suggest that Pufendorf
was in fact a Christian Stoic thinker; not least because he insisted, far more so than
did even Grotius, on the interconnected of divine authority and natural law, from
which his notion of socialitas and the attendant oﬃces of life (Oﬃcia) ultimately
derived. As Haakonssen therefore summarises:
[Pufendorf’s] basic oﬃces of life fall into three categories, that of being a human being tout
court, that of being a member of a family (as spouse, parent, child, sibling master, servant),
and that of being a member of a political society (as citizen, sovereign, all manner of magis-
trates, soldier, etc.). These three groups of oﬃces provide the basis for Pufendorf’s tripartite
division of his material into analyses of the speciﬁc natural jurisprudential relations of
persons as persons, of ‘oeconomical’ (household) relations in the traditional sense, and of
civic relations. Self-consciously inspired by Stoicism, this theory ﬁtted directly into the
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Christian Stoicism of the Enlightenment and lived on in the popular practical ethics of the
eighteenth century as Pufendorf’s most pervasive legacy – though often on very diﬀerent phi-
losophical foundations.77
Here Haakonssen is of course referring to Pufendorf’s inﬂuence on the Scottish Enlight-
enment and the political economy synonymous with it. In the following sections, however,
we will seek to divulge the natural jurisprudential and Christian Stoic legacy housed within
the thought of the Anglican churchmen Butler and Tucker.
4. The disparity between ‘Brute creatures’ and ‘moral government’: Joseph
Butler
Recognition of the Stoic tendencies in Butler’s thought has not been uncommon in the
centuries since the publication of his major works in the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth-
century. It is only relatively recently, however, that scholars have begun to appreciate
the full signiﬁcance of the philosophical tradition to the wider Butlerian scheme.
Terence Irwin has claimed, for example, that Butler’s ‘moral outlook’ and ‘appeal to
nature… reasonably invites a comparison with the Stoics’.78 Even more compellingly in
our context, A. A. Long writes that ‘in order to refute Hobbes and various contemporaries’
Butler’s ‘treatment of the two instincts – self-love and conscience – is too similar to the
Stoic concept oikeiosis to be adventitious’.79 Additionally, both scholars draw important
attention to Cicero’s inﬂuence on Butler, especially the Roman orator’s emphasis on the
‘reason of nature, which is divine and human law’, and which the later bishop of
Bristol and Durham also subscribed to in large part.80 However, aside from one passing
mention of Butler’s probable familiarity with Pufendorf’s Law of Nature and of
Nations,81 the intellectual connections between Butler and the seventeenth-century juris-
consults remains, to the present author’s knowledge, chronically underexplored.
For reasons which remain unclear, unlike Carmichael, Butler nowhere appears to have
praised Grotius or Pufendorf, and neither did he give them signiﬁcant pride of place
within his scheme.82 We do know, however, that based on the lecture notes of Samuel
Jones (c. 1681–1719), who was Butler’s tutor at the dissenting academy at Tewkesbury
between c. 1712–14, Butler was well-versed in their ideas.83 Born in Wales and educated
at Shrewsbury academy, the Presbyterian Jones had gone on to pursue his higher edu-
cation at the University of Leiden in the United Provinces in 1706. There, under the tute-
lage of Jacobus Gronovius (1645–1716), Jacobus Perizonius (1651–1715) and Hermanus
Witsius (1636–1708),84 he had familiarised himself with the Christian Stoic culture pre-
viously fostered by, among others, Justus Lipsius (who was a foundational Professor of
history at Leiden at the tail end of the sixteenth century), Grotius (who entered the Uni-
versity at a precociously young age, and whose father was a friend of Lipsius himself) and
Pufendorf (who spent many years at Leiden ruminating on the work of his predecessors
following his escape from captivity under Charles X of Sweden in the late-1650s).85 Evi-
dently, then, it was the Tewkesbury-Leiden connection which proved to be the initial inlet
by which Grotius and Pufendorf’s ideas came into Butler’s mind.86
Alongside Jones’s ‘Dutch-style’ teaching, Butler was also an avid reader of various con-
temporary English works, including John Locke’s (1632–1704) Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690),87 Shaftesbury’s ethics and Samuel Clarke’s (1675–1729) Boyle
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lectures.88 Extrapolating from this, it would be correct to say that Butler’s philosophy
therefore drew from two distinct traditions: ﬁrstly the natural jurisprudential Grotian
and Pufendorﬁan, and secondly the Newtonian natural theology of (especially) Clarke.
The present author has elsewhere shown how Butler, by adjoining his Anglican pas-
toralism and his developing ‘science’ of social psychology, oﬀered a profound contri-
bution to economic discourse in early-eighteenth century Britain – a project his
protégé Dean Tucker would ultimately see through to completion.89 Like Grotius and
Pufendorf, Butler adopted a fundamentally anti-Epicurean conception of human
nature, by means of equating human rationality with the social and benevolent aﬀec-
tions. Additionally, because Butler accepted that self-love constituted one among a plur-
ality of human aﬀections, he hypothesised further that the moral authority of a ‘Higher
principle’ was required in order to mediate the inward motives and outward behaviour
of human beings.90 In his famous correspondence with Clarke, the youthful Butler had
spoken of this principle in vague and imprecise terms by ascribing a moral function to
human nature which he claimed was a part of humanity’s ‘original frame and consti-
tution’.91 By the time of Fifteen Sermons (1726), however, Butler had developed this
kernel of a theory into a workable account of the conscience, which he thereafter
equated with ‘Reason and cool Reﬂection’.92
According to Butler, the ‘superior Faculty’ of the conscience assisted humans in
checking their ‘Immoderate Self-love’, thereby ensuring the cultivation and propagation
of peaceable human society (à la Grotius) and the species at large (à la Pufendorf).93
Taken together, these principles constituted what Butler called the ‘Commerce of
Humane Life’.94 Recognising, as Pufendorf before him, that self-love and
sociability ‘ought by no means to be made opposites’,95 Butler likewise claimed that
‘Self-love and Benevolence, Virtue and Interest are not to be opposed’, his main
point essentially being that human moral and material existence is unitary rather
than dialectical:
The Goodness or Badness of Actions does not arise from hence, that the Epithet, interested or
disinterested, may be applied to them; […] but from their being what they are; Namely, what
becomes such Creatures as we are, what the state of the Case requires, or the contrary.96
Again, just as Pufendorf had earlier noted that self-love and sociability ought to be placed
‘into the contrary Scale’,97 in Sermon XII ‘Upon the Love of our Neighbour’ Butler
adopted precisely the same metaphor. ‘The whole System, as I may speak, of Affections’,
Butler wrote: ‘The Case is here as in Scales: It is not oneWeight, considered in itself, which
determines whether the Scale shall ascend or descend; but this depends on the Proportion,
which that one Weight hath to the other’.98
By measuring self-love and sociability one against the other in such fashion, then,
Butler was evidently replicating the natural jurists’ respective adaptations of the Cicero-
nian ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis principle. Butler did, however, deviate from Grotius
(in particular) in one important respect, in that he placed the theory of oikeiosis on a
par with Revelation:
[The] Scripture, not being a Book of Theory and Speculation, but a plain Rule of Life for
Mankind, has with the utmost possible Propriety put the principle of Virtue upon the
Love of our Neighbour; which is that Part of the Universe, that Part of Mankind, that Part
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of our Country, which comes under our immediate Notice, Acquaintance, and Inﬂuence, and
with which we have to do.99
Yet even here Butler was reiterating, to a profound extent, Pufendorf’s argument inWhole
Duty of Man that religion was the ‘utmost and ﬁrmest Bond of Human Society’ (societatis
vinculum).100
As discussed above, the Grotian iteration of oikeiosis appeared to collapse the hitherto
theologically strict hierarchical structure between God, humankind and animal, in the inter-
ests of peaceable corporeal society.101 However, by reinstating God as (quasi-Hobbesian)
sovereign, Pufendorf reinstated the authority of divine law, maintaining – far more unequi-
vocally than did Grotius – that man’s rational and sociable faculties as ‘distinct from Brutes’
was ‘endow’d’ by God.102 Nevertheless, because Pufendorf ultimately derived human society
from the requirement of peace, stability and the cultivation of human society, his treatment
of the relationship between God and conscience was in a sense secondary: a psychological-
cum-meta-ethical strait between divine and natural law, rather than constituting its end.103
By contrast, Butler was far more at pains to emphasise God’s superintendence over the
oikeiosis process, primarily via the divinely-endued faculties of reason and reﬂection.
Because of this, the Butlerian variant of commercial sociability ultimately depended on
two distinct, yet interrelated, principles: ﬁrstly the notion of social harmony, or friendship,
among humans (analogous to Grotius’s appetitus societatis and Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’); and
second, the daily practice of loving God (αγαπη/love/agape).104 As we have seen, for the
natural jurists (particularly Grotius) the former was the fundamental bedrock of the
natural law. Conversely, for Butler, who was of course an Anglican latitudinarian cleric
ﬁrst and foremost and a metaphysician-cum-social theorist second, it was the latter.
The psychological disparity between ‘self’ and ‘other’, and more importantly the role of
the conscience in mediating the gamut of aﬀections lying between the two poles, was dis-
cussed most exhaustively, then, in Fifteen Sermons. However, in an important chapter of
The Analogy of Religion (1736), which was by far the more popular of the two works in
Butler’s own day, the soon to be bishop of Bristol concocted a series of hypothetical scen-
arios underscoring his understanding of the oikeiosis process. Signiﬁcantly, it was here too
that Butler oﬀered his schematic distinction between the ‘brute Creatures’ of the earth and
the ‘Moral Government of God’ – a dichotomy which bore more than a passing resem-
blance to Pufendorf’s division between entia physica and entia moralia, and the paradox-
ical inferiority and superiority between humans and animals.
According to Butler, whereas brutes are evidently of ‘superior Strength’ to men, it is the
faculty of reason which gives the latter the ‘Advantage and Superiority over’ the former. To
supplement his point, Butler then proposes the following. Firstly, suppose, Butler writes,
that there are two or three men ‘in a desolate open Plain, attacked by ten times the number
of Beasts of Prey’. Secondly, he writes, imagine a case in which rational and irrational crea-
tures are ‘of like external Shape andManner’. Finally, Butler asks the reader to consider the
likely fate of several men who ‘land on an Island inhabited only by wild Beasts’. In all three
scenarios, Butler contends that, whether animals enjoy the numerical or physical advan-
tage over humans, the latter can only survive and prosper if they utilise their rational and
sociable instincts in the interests of the collective ‘Bonds of Union’:
[A] Number of Men, who, by the Regulations of civil Government, the Inventions of Art, and
the Experience of some Years…would be really suﬃcient, to subdue the wild Beasts, and to
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preserve themselves in Security from them […] So that rational Animals have not necessarily
the [physical or numerical] Superiority over irrational ones; but, how improbable soever it
may be, it is evidently possible, that, in some [hypothetical] Globes, the latter may be
superior… , [nevertheless] Reason has, in the nature of it, a Tendency to prevail over
brute Force.105
The ﬁnal part of Butler’s scheme was thus to equate, unambiguously, the rational and
sociable faculties of humans with God’s moral government. This he had delineated in
Fifteen Sermons. ‘Brutes obey their Instincts of Principles of Action, according to certain
Rules’, he wrote, ‘suppose the Constitution of their Body, and the Objects around them’.
In turn this meant that animals were acting ‘suitably to their whole Nature’. Yet could
the same quality be applied to human beings tout court, Butler pondered? Evidently not,
for ‘Something further must be brought in to give us an adequate Notion of’ human
nature, he wrote; ‘namely, that Conscience or Reﬂection, compared with [other aﬀections
and appetites] as they all stand together in the Nature of Man, plainly bears upon it
Marks of Authority over all the rest’.106 According to Butler, then, it is precisely because
humans are inherently rational and sociable that they are ethical and virtuous creatures,
capable of coexisting peacefully in spite of the increasing complexities, if not even ‘Inconve-
niencies’ and ‘Incumbrances’, of new commercialised forms of social existence:
Fear, Resentment, Compassion and others; of which there could be no such Occasion or Use
in a perfect State: But in the present we should be exposed to greater Inconveniences without
them… They are Incumbrances indeed, but such as we are obliged to carry about with us,
through this various Journey of Life.107
Consequently, for Butler, whose philosophy prescribed to a basicallyWhiggish and pro-
commercial understanding of the eighteenth-century church and state establishment, the
oikeiosis principle was essentially tantamount to the deﬁning Christian principles of ‘love
of self’, ‘love of other’ and ‘love of God’, intertwined.108 Pufendorf’s ‘Bond of Human
Society’ had now been rechristened ‘The Cements of Society’: a deliberately sanguine
synonym for ‘commercial sociability’ in an increasingly materialistic, metropolitan –
and indeed selﬁsh – age.109
5. ‘The centrifugal and centripetal powers’: Bernard Mandeville and Josiah
Tucker
Like Grotius and Pufendorf, Butler was of course no theorist of market economies. Rather,
Fifteen Sermons was originally conceived as a theological-cum-meta-ethical rebuttal of
Hobbesian realpolitik, alongside ‘this whole set of writers’ who appeared to be following,
to a greater or lesser extent, in Hobbes’s wake.110 As Bob Tennant elaborates, this passage,
which Butler introduced as part of a preface to the second edition of the sermons in 1729,
housed many ‘references, explicit or implicit, to Clarke, Hobbes, Shaftesbury, Locke, Wol-
laston, Fénelon, (and possibly Guyon), Bossuet, the Epicureans, Rochefoucauld…Cicero
and the Stoics’, thereby providing a sense of the eclectic range of thinkers and ideas Butler
was reacting to.111 Yet beyond the rather glaring omissions of Grotius and Pufendorf,
Brooke adds further that an ‘absent presence on any such list’ was of course Bernard Man-
deville (1670–1733).112
16 P. X. PRICE
The socio-psychological analyses of Mandeville, the son of a Dutch physician who
settled in England in the 1690s, are complex, multifaceted and at times incredibly
subtle. Accordingly, they have been scrutinised in detail and at length in a number of
important studies, and need not be repeated here.113 Yet what is signiﬁcant from our
present standpoint is a brief consideration of the satirist’s dual-status as the eighteenth-
century populariser of Hobbes and as the heir of the Baylean Epicurean-Augustinian
model.114 This exposition is signiﬁcant for two reasons: ﬁrst, because it presents us with
an interesting duplication of the Grotius-Hobbes-Pufendorf arrangement in an eight-
eenth-century British context; and second, because it serves as a springboard by which
to analyse Tucker’s iteration of oikeiosis, which he did apply to a consideration of the
market economy for the ﬁrst time.
As is well known, the recalcitrant strength of Mandeville’s position rested on his
uncompromisingly pessimistic account of self-love, which he argued was basically tanta-
mount to ‘avariciousness’. Just as Hobbes before him, Mandeville dismissed the Aristote-
lian/Grotian notion that man was the zōon politikon. Instead, he sought to dispel the myth
(as he saw it) that either reason or religion was capable of controlling the irresistible ebb-
and-ﬂow of humanity’s baser passions. This being the case, Mandeville’s acerbic criticisms
of commercial modernity rested on three fundamental premises. Firstly, they positioned
notions of morality not anteriorly to society, but rather as the product of artiﬁce and con-
vention; second, they emphasised the centrality of the human passions and interests; and
lastly, they argued that humans were therefore innately self-centred, egoistic and selﬁsh
creatures.
On the one level, each of these properties was a clear re-articulation of Hobbes’s Epi-
curean-materialist scheme. Additionally, however, Mandeville’s system had also been
ﬁltered through an Augustinian and Baylean sieve, resulting in a particularly malignant
analysis of human nature and society. Claiming that the putative transition from the indi-
vidualised ‘self’ towards collective ‘society’ was fundamentally precarious, chaotic and
‘anti-social’ in nature, the Dutch-native speculated that the human instinct for survival
was a matter of indirect inﬂuence, in the guise of ﬂattery, persuasion, coercion and so
on. Nevertheless, as far as Mandeville was concerned, there must have been some sort
of providentialist explanation for this sequence of events since, given the vagaries of
self-love, the unlikely formation of civil society could surely only be said to have transpired
‘from God, by miracle’.115 Hence the ‘doctrine of Epicurus’, Mandeville surmised, ‘that
every thing is deriv’d from the Concourse and fortuitous Jumble of Atoms’ was only
half of the explanation as to the origin of human social organisation.116 The rest must,
therefore, be attributable – à la Nicole and Bayle – to God’s redemptive plan.
Mandeville’s system, and particularly its infamous exaltation of luxury and vice as the
two main drivers of material progress, was clearly a dagger to the heart of the British com-
mercial establishment. For, by fastening his Baylean-inspired scheme to the ‘Epicurean
motif’, as Blom has usefully termed it,117 Mandeville positioned himself squarely at
odds with idealistic, quasi-Stoic defences of the post-1688 commercial order associated
with the likes of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Joseph Addison (1672–1719), Richard Steele
(1672–1729) and William Law (1686–1761) among others. As we have seen, Butler’s
Fifteen Sermons was of course one such Stoic response to Mandeville, and perhaps the
most potent given that it drew equally from Clarke’s epistemology in order to deal with
Mandeville’s arguments on their own terms. Yet as these pages argue further, by
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drawing the psychological mechanisms of oikeiosis ﬁrmly within the Christian framework,
this enabled Butler to confute Hobbes and Mandeville’s radically reductionist interpret-
ation of man as a passion-led and self-centred animal, while also fastening onto a strategy
long-established by Grotius and Pufendorf to counter the sceptical arguments of their own
day. As we shall see, it was precisely this iteration of Stoic oikeiosis that Tucker adopted as
the basis for his developing science of political economy.
Tucker’s most conspicuous engagement with the oikeiosis principle appears in the ‘Pre-
liminary Discourse’ to the unﬁnished Elements of Commerce and Theory of Taxes (1755), a
work which was originally intended as didactic material for the then Prince of Wales and
future King George III (1738–1820).118 Initially conceding that humans ‘hath the Appe-
tites of an Animal’, Tucker observes that as rational agents, they also have the additional
‘Temper and Aﬀections’ of social beings. By the ‘gracious Contrivance of the Author of
Nature’, he continues, providence has ordained that humans require mutual assistance
in life in order to procure ‘Improvements’ within society. This is clearly important to
them, Tucker posits, because just as nature intends that humans seek food in order to
appease their appetite of hunger, so too does it prompt them to seek to better the
society in which they live in order to ‘gratify’ their corresponding ‘social Instincts’.
Tucker calls this the human ‘Prerogative’—that is to say, our ‘Set of social and benevolent
Aﬀections’—and what is more, he concludes, it is this familiar characteristic which most
distinguishes us from the beasts.119
In this opening passage, Tucker is clearly alluding to Butler’s insistence in Fifteen
Sermons that the prospect of peaceable society is a fortuitous-cum-providential
outcome of unintended consequences:
[As] Persons without any Conviction from Reason of the desirableness of Life, would yet of
Course preserve it merely from the Appetite of Hunger; so by acting merely from Regard
(suppose) to Reputation, without any Consideration of the Good of others, Men often con-
tribute to publick Good.120
Additionally, however, Tucker both qualiﬁes and furthers Butler’s initial premise by
admitting, far more readily than does his mentor, that society is potentially the chief
cause of humanity’s woes, and therefore a double-edged sword. For though society may
be the ‘best Means of procuring a Supply for [our] animal or natural Wants’, Tucker
writes, so too does society entice us towards our desirous, passionate and multitudinous
‘artiﬁcial Needs’; and here Tucker is referring primarily to the excesses of luxury, which
he believes are the by-products of our own and others’ misdirected self-love. In
Tucker’s view, self-love is evidently ‘narrow and conﬁned in its Views’, so that if it is
left with no ‘Direction or Controll’ it will eventually ‘defeat its own Ends’ until ‘even
Self-interest is loser’.121 However if directed into its proper channels, Tucker insists that
self-love will serve the public good in ways which far exceed individual enterprise:
[The] ﬁrst…Wants of Mankind [are] much better supplied by dividing the general Labour
into diﬀerent Branches, than if each Individual depended on himself alone for the Supply of
[them.] And this [portioning out] of the common Labour [gives rise to] distinct Trades and
Manufactures; and may therefore be considered… [the] Rudiments of Commerce.
[… Therefore] as our present secular Happiness appears to arise from the Enjoyment of
superior Wealth, Power, Honour, Pleasure, or Preferment, SELF-LOVE, the great mover
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of created Beings, determines each Individual to aspire after these social Goods, and to use the
most probable Means of obtaining them.122
On the one hand, Tucker’s analysis in this passage is a clear anticipation of Smith’s
famous iteration of the division of labour,123 which had had numerous historical antece-
dents ranging from Plato to, more recently, William Petty (1620–1687) and Mandeville
himself. Viewed from the opposite chronological perspective, however, Tucker’s model
is also none other than a Butlerian adaptation of Pufendorf’s foundational imbecillitas
—indigentia—cultura argument.124 Speciﬁcally Tucker’s ‘ﬁrst wants’—‘rudiments of com-
merce’—‘artiﬁcial needs’ conﬁguration is plainly analogous to Pufendorf’s theory that (a)
individual weakness and self-preservation (b) leads humans to thirst for the superﬂuities
of life, which (c) precipitates human industry, the portioning of labour and sociality.125 At
the same time, however, as an Anglican prelate, Tucker adheres most dutifully to Butler’s
brand of neo-Stoicism when he states that in order to ameliorate (on a societal level) the
worst excesses of ‘inordinate Self-love’, the Butlerian ‘Counter-Agent[s]’ of ‘REASON and
REFLECTION’ must always be called on to ‘Aid the social and benevolent Principle’:
[So that] when the auxiliary Motives of Reason are called in Aid of social Love, or diﬀusive
Benevolence, this latter becomes, in a good degree, a Counter-Agent to inordinate Self-Love.
So that the Circulation of Commerce may be conceived to proceed from the Impulse of two
distinct Principles of Action in Society, analogous to the centrifugal and centripetal Powers in
the Planetary System.126
As these passages make clear, then, Tucker’s political economy ought to be construed as
the theoretical highpoint of the oikeiosis trajectory chronicled within these pages. Snaking
its way from Grotius and Pufendorf to Butler and Tucker—via crucial ‘concessionary’
detours through Hobbes’s state of nature and Mandeville’s post-lapsarian ‘Grumbling
Hive’—Tucker’s ‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ powers, clearly borrowing from Newton’s
Principia, are tantamount to the ‘opposing’ principles of self-love and sociability, in a
didactic repetition of Grotius’s foundational ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis argument.
For it is plain to see that within the Tuckerian scheme, self-love is analogous to the cen-
tripetal power within human nature, tending naturally and therefore legitimately towards
the innermost, ‘egoistic’ self. Concomitantly, sociability is the centrifugal power (again,
conceived as the Grotian appetitus societatis or Pufendorf’s ‘sociality’), tending away
from the innermost self towards what Forman-Barzilai has termed, albeit in the context
of Smith’s economic thought, the ‘commercial cosmopolis’.127
Once again, however, just as in Butler’s example, Tucker’s conclusory act was to draw
Grotius and Pufendorf’s theoretical foundations ﬁrmly within the Whiggish-cum-Angli-
can context. Borrowing from Pufendorf’s distinction between entia physica and entia
moralia, and similarly from the Butlerian dichotomy between ‘Brute Creation’ and
‘Moral Government’, in the ﬁrst instance Tucker proclaimed that God was ‘governor’ of
both ‘natural [i.e. corporeal] Government’ and ‘MORAL GOVERNMENT’. Continuing
in a Butlerian vein, Tucker insisted further, however, that because rational creatures
were evidently ‘moral Agents’, they were duty-bound to mediate between the natural
(self-preservative) and moral (sociable) worlds, in due proportion to the ‘natural Stint
and Bound’ of their individual and collective social aﬀections.128 Only in so doing, he con-
cluded, could individuals locate their rightful place as fully socialised and ethical creatures
within ‘this wonderful Fabrick’ of ‘the divine Oeconomy’.129
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It is interesting to note that, like Butler, Tucker nowhere acknowledged Pufendorf’s
inﬂuence (nor did he make any overt mention, incidentally, of Hobbes). By contrast, in
the penultimate section of his magnum opus The Treatise Concerning Civil Government
(1781), the clergyman was explicit about Grotius’s legacy. Written primarily against
British rational dissenters, North American revolutionaries and the ‘metaphysical’130 doc-
trine of universal natural rights which undergirded their various philosophies, Tucker laid
contemporary calls for parliamentary reform and relief from the Test and Corporation
Acts squarely at the feet of Locke.131 By contrast, placing Grotius alongside Aristotle
and Cicero for the ancients and Richard Hooker (1554–1600) for the moderns, Tucker
invoked the Dutch jurist’s work in a staunch defence of the established political order
based on ‘limitted Monarchy, and Constitutional, (though not… Republican) Whigg
[ism]’.132 Tellingly, it was the famous oikeiosis/appetitus societatis passage from Rights
of War and Peace Tucker saw ﬁt to quote,133 after which he adduced that
according to the Testimony of GROTIUS, Mankind are naturally inclined… to join in a
social State, and to partake in the Blessings of a Body Politic… For [in] every Page, and
every Line of his Treatise, concerning the Rights of War and Peace… he demonstrates…
that private Subjects… are bound in Duty to pay a prompt and willing Obedience to all
the Laws of [the] State… by which they are protected, except in those unhappy Cases…
where the Laws of the State are manifestly and directly repugnant to the Laws of Nature,
and of God.134
Tucker’s invocation of Grotius in the Treatise leads us ﬁnally, then, to the clergyman’s
decidedly Pufendorﬁan conclusion about the role and content of the natural law within his
economic scheme. As has been shown elsewhere,135 at its core Tucker’s political economy
was premised on the unavoidability of social subordination, rank and hierarchy as necess-
ary prerequisites of modern commercial societies. It was for this very reason that his socio-
economics was wedded so ﬁrmly to his defence of existing structures in church and state.
In consequence, Tucker reproached the doctrine of inalienable universal rights on the
basis that it superseded the natural and civilisational principles and protocols of economic
progress. As J. G. A. Pocock demonstrated over three decades ago, Tucker’s stance on this
score was borne out of his wholesale rejection of (in his view) the fundamentally ‘unhis-
torical character’ of the ‘Lockean compact’, resulting from the erroneous (because ‘anti-
social’) ‘divorce of the individual from society brought about by the substitution of
natural right for natural law’.136 As these pages have articulated further, however,
Tucker’s position owed a substantial, if not fundamental, debt to Pufendorf’s ﬁctive
state of nature as outlined above.137 For whereas Hobbes and Locke, despite their
diﬀering conclusions, contended that a state of natural equality did exist among the earliest
roaming families,138 conversely, Pufendorf’s state of nature conﬁrmed Tucker’s contrast-
ing view that hierarchies were natural to human beings tout court, whether in pre-civil or
in advanced commercial societies. Consequently, for Tucker, history taught that
‘[h]umans were naturally sociable and unequal, yet mutually needy, some naturally sub-
missive, some not; this was quite enough to account for and legitimate the emergence
of both political society and hierarchy without “tedious [and] uncertain experiments” in
contractualism’.139
In closing we might add that, as far as Tucker was concerned, this explanation was also
quite enough to account for the emergence of commercial society in tandem with the
20 P. X. PRICE
political. For, again as Pocock succinctly worded it, Tucker’s economic scheme was pre-
mised—perhaps uniquely, because unequivocally, among his contemporaries—on the
fundamental basis that ‘the principles of economic progress are those of natural law’.140
Be that as it may, as this essay has attempted to inculcate in addition to this analysis,
the Tuckerian variant of the natural law was decidedly Grotian, Pufendorﬁan and Butler-
ian in its orientation, constituting the highpoint of the hierarchical oikeiosis process:
Being such a beautiful and inﬁnite Variety of Creatures one above another in the Scale of Life
… It can surely be noWrong to me, that I am not created an Angel: Nor is it any Injury to the
Brute that he not made aMan. All Creatures were never intended to be of the highest Order
… Subordinations, Gradations, and Dependancies throughout the whole System of Being; if
the glorious Attributes and Perfections of the Deity are thereby more eﬀectually displayed; if
the Beauty of the whole Frame of Nature is rendered more grand and august by such a rich
Variety; and if the Foundation of relative and social Duties require such a Constitution in the
moral World; then consequently some must be higher, and some lower in the Order and
Scale of Things: All cannot be alike, where it is required there should be so great a
Diversity.141
6. Conclusion
Building primarily on Hont’s thesis regarding the intellectual dynamic between Grotius,
Hobbes and Pufendorf, this essay has attempted to advance two core arguments which
require highlighting in conclusion. The ﬁrst is to assert that the eighteenth-century
‘science of man’, revolving around a new ethics of commercial sociability (or ‘unsocial
sociability’)142 and typically associated with the Scottish contribution to economic and
social theory, can initially be traced back to Grotius’s foundational ideas in Rights of
War and Peace. By itself this observation is hardly novel: in fact, it borders on a virtual
tautology. Yet whereas recent analyses have tended to treat the ‘unsocial sociability’
trope in dichotomous ‘Epicurean-Augustinian versus Stoic’ terms,143 typically emphasis-
ing the predominance of the former over the latter, the novelty of this paper is that it has
attempted to recast the debate, however tentatively, as a theoretical propagation of Gro-
tius’s distinctive ‘personal’ and ‘social’ oikeiosis argument.144 This said, the article’s
second main claim is that eighteenth-century British political economy ought not to be
framed in exclusively Scottish, moderately secularising and primarily self-interest-based
terms.145 Rather, by examining the kinship between Grotius and Pufendorf’s, and
Butler and Tucker’s, respective iterations of the oikeiosis mechanism, these pages validate
the existence of an alternative neo-Stoic trajectory, resulting in an overtly sociability-based
Christian political economy.
What is the broader signiﬁcance of this? The ﬁrst answer to this question rests on the
need to acknowledge Butler and Tucker’s theological contributions to eighteenth-century
economic discourse and indeed the Scottish Enlightenment, which has hitherto remained
underemphasised. Hont, for example, argued that whatever was left of Christian theology in
Smith’s conception of commercial society was merely vestigial, and essentially a rejection, of
Hutcheson’s neo-Stoic teachings.146 Similarly, Hume’s attempts to grapple with, and ulti-
mately disown, Hutcheson’s Christian Stoicism are well documented.147 Yet, while it is
important not to overstate Butler and Tucker’s inﬂuence, it is nevertheless worth remember-
ing that the pair were much lauded among the Scottish moralists, and not least Hutcheson
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himself. Indeed, Hutcheson, Hume and Lord Kames (1696–1782) all spoke admiringly of
Butler in their published writings.148 Similarly, Tucker corresponded with Hume and
Kames in the 1750s and 1760s on various issues related to trade and commerce, though
most notably on the reciprocal dynamics between rich and poor countries in an increasingly
competitive global market (indeed it is in this respect alone that Hont associates Tucker’s
Christian providentialism with the Scottish Enlightenment).149 Thus, when Hume wrote
to Kames of Tucker’s ideas that, ‘conformable to the character both of a divine and a phi-
losopher, [he] draws an argument from the goodness of providence; but I think it may be
turned against him’,150 we note the Scottish philosopher’s acknowledgement of Tucker’s
Christian Stoic naturalism – albeit steeped in the scepticism for which Hume remains notor-
ious. Viewed from yet another perspective, Tucker’s economic writings from the period
exhibit traces of the conjectural history – indeed, the ‘Four-Stages Theory’ of societal devel-
opment which Hont refers to as the endpoint of the Pufendorﬁan scheme – for which many
of the Scottish school were shortly to become famous.151 We would do well to note, for
instance, some striking similarities between Tucker’s historico-commercial analyses and
that of William Robertson (1721–93). On closer inspection, it is no coincidence to ﬁnd
that the Presbyterian Robertson had also been schooled, like Butler, by a former student
of Leiden, Charles Mackie (1688–1770).152
The second answer to the above query obliges us to revisit Smith’s conception of oikeiosis.
In a chapter in The Theory of Moral Sentiments entitled ‘Of licentious systems’, Smith refor-
mulated the ‘self-interest–sociability’ conundrum in terms of the disparity between ‘partiali-
ty’–‘impartiality’, which, crucially, was modelled on the philosophical contrast between
Mandeville and Butler’s respective taxonomies.153 Put very brieﬂy, here Smith characterised
Mandeville’s ‘licentious system’ as that which fashioned the ‘indulgent and partial spectator’:
the individual who only yielded to a higher political authority because their vanity and self-
love had been appealed to. Conversely, Smith’s Butler-inspired ‘impartial spectator’—the
individual of genuine ‘self-command’, who was capable of looking beyond their narrow
self-interest towards the public good—was the ﬁgure truly worthy of emulation.154 It has
not escaped notice that Smith’s conception of the ‘impartial spectator’ in this, and in other
sections, of Moral Sentiments positioned the Scottish philosopher ‘very close to… Butler’s
account of conscience’,155 thereby revealing him at his ‘most Stoic’.156 Adjacently, it has
also long been acknowledged that Smith owned several of Tucker’s tracts in his private
library; and while the Elements of Commerce is not listed among them,157 A.M. C.Waterman
points out that there is nevertheless good reason to suggest that Smith read the tract given the
‘many traces of Tucker’s Butlerian view of the human condition’ inMoral Sentiments, penned
merely three years later.158 This said, it is a distinct possibility that Smith’s treatment of oikeio-
sis was modelled on the Butlerian and Tuckerian iteration.159
To conclude, then, in this paper we have demonstrated an intriguing eighteenth-
century ‘re-enactment’ of the Grotius-Hobbes-Pufendorf dynamic, in the guise of the
Butler-Mandeville-Tucker conﬁguration. Recognised the ferocity of the compulsions of
Mandevillean self-love, in a mirror-image of Pufendorf’s earlier concession to Hobbesian
self-preservation, Tucker nevertheless ultimately sided with Butler, just as Pufendorf did
Grotius. It is in this vein that Laurence Dickey summarises Tucker’s economic scheme
as ‘a modernization of the oikeiosis process and a Christianization of it,’ in which he
‘reinforces in the name of Christian morality and Christian providentialism what
Cicero had philosophically sanctioned in his discussion of oikeiosis and Grotius and
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Pufendorf in their natural law versions of the sociability argument.’160 While it is undoubt-
edly correct, then, to draw theoretical parallels between the seventeenth-century juriscon-
sults and the eighteenth-century Scottish political economists, as Hont did and others
continue to do, this paper has shown that there are adjacent narratives, trajectories and
lines of inquiry which require our attention. Butler and Tucker are one such example of
this; no doubt there are others yet to be exposed.
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